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7153 
Ca~e No. 7'153 
'\ 
_-IN THE SUPRDIE COURT 
of the State of Utah 
-ERT WOLFE, SHIRLEY WOLFE, 
lds wife, ELLIOTT WOLFE, KAYL~ 
WOLFE, a.nd MERRILL STRONG, Co-
flittners, (!oing business under the firm 
1f8lne·andstyle of WOLFE'S DEPART-
lDlNT ~--STORE and WOLFE'S DE-
PARTMENT STORE, a copartnership, 
" · Plm'i!rbtiffs ~ood Appellatt~, 
.:- vs. i~ . 
SARAH WHITE and JAMES L. WHITE, ~tJ_er:husband, 
i ·' ~. 
Defendants and BesponrJents. 
APPELLANT'S'' B'RIE'F 
If I 14 ~ R n~sHIRLEY P. JONES and fiA - ~-·"' . RICH & STRONG, ~-R l 0 1948 AttornJeys ~o'r Plaitn:tiffs. 
..... ~·----- amd AppeUamts . 
. . -~~. riiuR;;~;~;;--
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
HUBERT \VOLFE, SHIRLEY \VOLFE, 
his wife, ELLIOTT \VOLFE, KA YLA 
\YOLFE, and ~[ERRILL STRONG, Co-
partners, doing business under the fir1n 
name and style of WOLFE'S DEPART-
~IEXT STORE and 'VOLFE'S DE-
PART:JIEXT STORE, a copartnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
~ARAH 'YHITE and JA1IES L. \VHITE, 
her husband, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
7153 
This appeal is to review the action of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in ~ustain­
ing defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs' com-
plaint and amendments thereto and its judgment dis-
missing the said complaint and an1endments thereto and 
dismissing the above-entitled action, said judgment was 
entered and filed Nove1nber 15, 1947. (R. 56, 57) De-
fendants filed special demurrers and motions to strike, 
but the same were overruled and denied by the trial 
eourt. (R. 56, 57) 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises from plaintiffs' claim that defend-
ants breached certain terms of a written lease agree-
ment under which defendants leased to plaintiffs prop-
erty situated in the business district of Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Since the case below was disposed of upon general 
demurrer, we shall for the convenience of the court set 
forth the lease, the complaint, amendments thereto and 
exhibits verbatim. 
The plaintiffs and appellants are the lessees, and 
the defendants and respondents are the lessors but here-
after will be designated merely as plaintiffs and defend-
ants. 
The lease ,is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 
"A," (R. 8), and reads as follows: 
EXHIBIT ''A'' 
LEASE 
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE made and 
executed at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 19th 
day of February, 1945, by and between SARAH 
WHITE, owner of the premises hereinafter de-
scribed, and JAMES L. WHITE, her husband, 
· of 'Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to 
as ''Lessors,'' and HUBERT WOLFE, SHIR-
LEY WOLFE, his wife, ELLIOTT WOLFE, 
KAYLA WOLFE and MERRILL STRONG, co-
partners, all of Salt Lake City, Utah, doing busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the firm name 
and style of "Wolfe's Department Store," which 
co-partnership is also bound in this lease as 
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.. \Volfe'~ Deparhnent Store," a copartnership, 
· b~· HUBERT \YOLFE, nmnaging partner, here-
inafter referred to as ··Lessees,'' 
\V I T N E ~ S E T H : 
That said parties do 1uutually covenant, grant 
and agree to and with earh other as follows: 
(1) 
Lessors do hereby grant, lease and den1ise 
unto the Lessees, for a term to commence on the 
I th day of ~larch, 1945, and to end on the 31st 
day of ~[ay, 1956, the following described premises 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, to-wit: 
The one-story building, basement and 
balcony, commonly designated as 248-256 
South State Street, having dimensions of ap-
proxilnately 78 feet 3 inches on State ~treet, 
by 123 feet 6 inches in depth. 
together with the use of the right-of-way Im-
mediately south of the Keeley store at 260 Sou_th 
State Street, and together with the use of the load-
ing platform in the r·ear of the premises· herein 
leased, it being understood that the buildings and 
parking space West of said loading platform are 
now leased to and are being used by Keeley's In" 
corporated and other tenants, who have the ex-
clusive right to use s.aid parking space. Said 
premises are to be occupied for the conduct of 
a Inercantile business, which will not compete or 
conflict with the business now being conducted by 
Keeley's Incorporated at 260 South 'State Street. 
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(2) 
The Lessees shall pay to the Lessors as rent 
for said premises during the ter1n thereof as fol-
lows: 
The total sum of Eighty Thousand One Hun-
dred Thirty Dollars ($80,130.00), payable' in 
monthly installments of Five Hundred Fifty Dol-
lars ($550.00) each for the months commencing 
March 7, 1945 to June 6, 1946, a period of fifteen 
(15) months, the sum of Four Hundred Eighty 
Dollars ( $480.00) for the period commencing June 
7th, 1946, and ending June 30th, 1946, and Six 
Hundred Dollars ( $600.00) per month for the nine 
years and eleven months period commencing July 
1st, 1946 and ending May 31st, 1956, each in ad-
vance on the first day of each and every month 
during said period. 
(3) 
The rental for the last ten year term of this 
lease is fixed at Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) 
per month, upon the express condition that the 
Lessees will, and they hereby agree to, at their 
own expense, make permanent improvements to 
the building herein leased, including the installa-
tion of a first-class front therein, which improve-
ments shall cost not less, but 1nay cost more than, 
Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00). Said Ten 
Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00) shall not include 
the cost of trade fixtures, or any other removable 
fixtures, but shall include only the cost of perma-
nent improvements to the building. If it should 
develop that necessary permanent improvement~ 
can be made for less than Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,0QO.OO), then the rent for the last ten year 
term of this lease shall be increased Ten Doilars 
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5 
~$10.00) per uwnth, or fraction thereof, for every 
thousand dollars, or frartion thereof, that the 
pennanent ilnproven1ents cost less than Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), and for the pur-
pose of detennining the fart, Lessees agree at the 
c01npletion of said pennanent improven1ents to 
furnish Lessors with an iteinized statmnent of the 
cost of pennanent improvements made as afore-
said. The said pennanent ilnprovements are to be 
con1menced on or before June 7th, 1946, or as soon 
thereafter as Government restrictions will per-
Init. Rental shall be paid during the time said im-
proveinents are being made. All such pennanent 
ilnprovenients and construction shall be completed 
free and clear of all liens and claims of contract-
ors, sub-contractors, mechanics, laborers, nla-
terial n1en and other persons having si1nilar 
clain1s. All such permanent improvements shall 
upon installation become part of the realty and 
shall be surrendered to the Lessors in good order 
and condition as when constructed, reasonable 
"-ear and tear and damage by fire or other casual-
ty excepted. After said permanent improvements 
are n1ade, it is agreed that further structural 
changes shall not be made to said premises by the 
Lessees, without first obtaining the written con-
sent of the Lessors, which consent Lessors cove-
nant will not unreasonably be withheld. 
(4) 
Lessees shall also pay all charges for light, 
heat, electricity, gas and water consumed upon the 
den1ised premises during the term of this lease. 
(5) 
It is understood and agreed that the premises 
herein leased are presently leased to Daniel Stew-
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6 
art doing business as ''Stewart Novelty Com-pa~y," until June 6, 1946, at Five Hundred :B--,ifty 
Dollars ($550.00) per month, and that this lease i~ 
1nade subject to that lease. It is further agreed 
that the Lessors shall collect the rents from Stew-
art Novelty Company for the term ending June 
6, 1946, and providing the said rents are paid by 
Stewart Novelty Company, it is agreed that the 
Lessees will have no further obligation under thi~ 
lease for the term ending June 6, 1946, and like-
wise will not be ,entitled to the possession of said 
premises for said term. If Stewart Novelty de-
faults in the payrnent of rent, however, then the 
responsibility of the Lessees for the term end-
ing June 6, 1946 will commence, and in case of 
such default the Lessees agree to pay said rental 
in accordance with the terms hereof, and in such 
event will be entitled to all of the Lessors' rights 
and re1nedies against Stewart Novelty Company 
by reason of said default. 
(6) 
In consideration of the r,ental herein fixed, 
the Lessees agree to and do hereby accept said 
premises in the condition and state of repair they 
are now in, and foff" the last ten ye,ars of this Lease, 
all improvements, upkeep and repairs, of every 
kind and nature whatsoever, regardless of the ex-
tent thereof and whether the same be ordinary or 
I , • 
extraordinary, and regardless of how the same 
may be necessitated, except as hereinafter stated, 
including repair and upkeep of the heating plant 
and replacement of all glass, including plate glass 
broken, -are to be made at the expense of the 
Lessees. If pl~te glass iU:surance is carried, it shall 
be carried at the expense of the Lessees. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
(7) 
Lessees agree that at the expiration of the 
term o( this lease they will ~~ield and deliver up 
the said de1nised premises to the Lessors, in as 
good order and condition as the san1e will be after 
the initial pel'lnanent i1nproven1ents above con-
tenlplated are completed, reasonable use and wear 
thereof and damage by the elements excepted. 
Lessees agree to occupy said pren1ises in a law-
ful 1nanner and to keep the water pipes and their 
connections and sewage pipes and their connec-
tions upon said pre1nises at all times in good con-
dition and state of repair. 
(8) 
For the entire term of this lease the Lessors 
shall have the obligation to keep the roof of the 
leased premises in good condition and repair; to 
pay general taxes and lighting ass·essments levied 
against said property, all fire insurance premiums. 
and premiums on any other insurance the owner 
elects to carry. 
(9) 
Lessees covenant and agree not to assign, 
transfer, hypothecate or mortgag·e this lease, or 
any interest therein, without first' obtaining the 
written consent of the Lessors, which consent Les-
sors covenant wiJl not unreasonably be withheld. 
If such consent is given by the Lessors, it is under-
stood and agreed that the Lessees shall continue 
to ren1ain liable under all the terms, covenants 
and conditions of this lease. 
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(10) 
If the rent above reserved, or any part there-
of, shall be unpaid on the date whereon the same 
is due and payable, and for fifteen days thereafter, 
or if default shall be made in any of the covenants 
herein contained to be kept by the Lessees, their 
heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, it shall 
and may be lawful for the said Lessors, their heirs, 
executors, administrators, agents, attorneys or 
assigns, to take possession of the demised prem-
ises, and every part thereof, either with or with-
out legal process, and without notice to quit to 
re-enter and the same again to repossess and en-
joy as in their first and former estate. 
(11) 
Lessors shall not be liable for any dan1age 
occasioned by failure to keep said premises in 
repair and shall not be liable for any damage done, 
caused or occasioned by or frorn plumbing, gas, 
wat·er, steam or other pipes, or the bursting, leak-
ing or running of any washstand, tank, water 
closet or waste pipe, in, upon or about said build-
ing or prmnises, nor from any damage occasioned 
by water arising from acts or neglect of neighbor-
ing tenants. 
(12) 
If Lessees shall abandon or vacate said prem-
ises, the same shall be re-let by the Lessors for 
such rent and upon such terms as Lessors shall 
see fit, and if a sufficient sum shall not be thus 
realized, after paying the expenses of such re-
letting and collecting to satisfy the rent hereby re-
served, the Lessees agree to pay and satisfy all 
deficiency. 
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(13) 
Le8sees agree that if the ,estate rreated here-
by shall be taken upon exerntion or any other 
proress of law, or if the Lessees shall be declared 
bankrupt or insolvent, or any receiver be ap-
pointed for the business and property of the Les-
sees and be not discharged within 60 days, or if 
any assignn1ent shall be made of the Lessees' 
property for the "benefit of c-reditors, or if Lessees 
shall apply for reorganization or any extension 
agree1nent with their creditors under any federal 
or state law now in force or hereafter enacted, 
then and in that event Lessors shall have the op-
tion of terminating this lease, or in their dis-
cretion, or exercising any and all other remedies to 
which they may be entitled as a matter of law. 
(14) 
It is agreed that the rent and charges above 
reserved shall be a first lien on the furniture, fix-
tures and personal property of the Lessees, and 
that said property shall not be removed from said 
pre1nises until the rent and other charges are 
fully paid. 
(15) 
~ o waiver of any breach of any covenant, 
condition or stipulation herein contained shall be 
taken to be a waiver of any succeeding breach 
thereof, and the acceptance of rent during any 
period in which the Lessees may be in default 
shall not be deemed to be a waiver of such default. 
(16) 
The Lessors covenant and agree that the Les-
sees upon paying the rental herein provided and 
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10 
performing all of the covenants and agreements 
herein contained, shall and Inay in accordance 
herewith peacefully and quietly have, hold and 
enjoy said demised premises during the term here-
of. 
(17) 
If Lessors .commence and successfully prose-
cute any action against the Lessees to protect or 
enforce any of Lessors' right hereunder, or if 
Lessors defend successfully in any action or pro-
ceeding by the Lessees against the Lessors, the 
Lessees will pay to Lessors a reasonable at-
torney's fee in each such action, and Lessees shall 
likewise receive a reasonable attorney's fee if 
they are successful in each such action. 
(18) 
In the event that the demised premises shall 
be destroyed by fir,e or the elements before or 
after the commencement of the term herein speci-
fied, this lease shall wholly cease and terminate. 
In the event that said premises are rendered un-
tenable by fire or the ,elements, Lessors agree to 
repair and restore said premises with reasonable 
dispatch. In case of such repairs the rent due 
hereunder shall abate during the making of the 
same. 
(19) 
That the Lessees, their heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators or assigns, shall have the right and 
option to lease said premises for a further term 
of ten years, cmnmencing June 1st, 1956, on the 
same terms and conditions as apply to the period 
of the present lease, commencing June 7th, 1946, 
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except for rental and exeept that during "aid ex-
tended period Lessees shall not be obligated to 
make permanent inlproveinents provided in para-
graph 3 hereof. Said right and option to re-lease 
shall be exereised by the Lessees by serving writ-
ten notice upon the Lessors, their heirs, executors, 
ad1ninistrators or assigns, at least six Inonths 
prior to ~Iay 31st, 1936, whieh notice shall be to 
the effeet that said Lessees do then exercise said 
option. If ~meh written notice is not served by the 
Lessees upon the Lessors within the tiine and in 
the manner stated, then said option shall expire. 
If said notice is served within the time and in the 
Inanner in this paragraph stated, the rental for 
the extended term shall then be fixed by agree-
ment between the parties at a minimum of Six 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per nwnth, and 
at a maximum of Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($850.00) per month, said determination to be 
made in accordance 'vith the then going rate of 
rental and business conditions as they then exist. 
If and after said option is exercised by the Les-
sees, and if the parties eannot 'then agree on a 
rental between said minimum and maximum, then 
each shall appoint an arbitrator and the two so 
appointed shall choose a third and a 1najority of 
the three shall fix the monthly rental to be paid 
by the Lessees to the Lessors between the mini-
Inurn and maximum herein stated, and their de-
cision shall be binding· upon the parties hereto. 
(20) 
No remedy herein conferred upon the Les-
sors shall be considered exclusive of any other 
remedy, but the same shall be cumulative and 
shall be in addition to every other remedy given 
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12 
hereunder, or now or hereafter existing at law or 
in equity or by statute. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Lessors 
and Lessees have hereunto executed this agree-
ment the day and year first hereinabove written. 
( 1Signed by the parties) 
From the tenns of the lease it will be noted that 
the defendants leased to the plaintiffs the building at 
248-256 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, ·which 
is now known as "Wolfe's 1Sportsman's Headquarters." 
While the lease is dated February 19, 1945, the plain-
tiffs by the provisions of paragraph 5 were not, upon 
the occurrence of certain contingencies which did occur, 
to hav·e any rights of possession or any obligations under 
the lease until June 7, 1946, some 15 n1onths later than 
its date. On the date of the lease the ~premises were oc-
cupied by the St;ewart Novelty Company under a lease 
ending J nne 6, 1946, and if the Stewart Novelty Com-
pany paid their lease rental, then the plaintiffs here were 
not to have any rights of possession or obligations under 
their lease until June 7, 1946. The Stewart Novelty Com-
pany paid its rent, and so plaintiffs did not become en-
titled to the possession of the leased premises and had 
no obligations under the lease until June 7, 1946, and 
• then for a term of ten years ending May 31st, 1956; desig-
nated in the lease as the last ten years. It is important 
to bear these facts in mind. For the 15 months covered 
by the lease preceding June 7, 1946, the plaintiffs had 
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13 
neither rig-ht:' nor obligations, but defendants tlid have 
obligati(m~. 
In paragraph 6 of the lease the plaintiffs '"agree to 
and do hereby accept said pren1ises in the condition and 
state of repair they are now in," but under paragraph 
S the defendants ·who drew the lease Inade the following 
covenant: • • For the entire tenn of this lease the Lessors 
~hall have the obligation to keep the roof of the leased 
prmnises in good condition. and repair." In other words, 
the plaintiffs only conditionally accepted the premises 
in the condition and state of repair they were in on Feb.-
ruary 19, 19±5; that acceptance was modified, conditioned 
and lin1ited by the express agreement of the defendants 
that plaintiffs had no responsibility for the roof and 
that defendants alone assumed that responsibility for 
the entire term of the lease. The plaintiffs accepted the 
pre1nises 15 n1onths before they ever went into posses-
sion only provided the defendants for that 15 1nonths 
period and for the entire remaining term should keep the 
roof in good condition and repair. 
In paragraph 6 the plaintiffs agreed that after 
they took possession or for the last 10 years of the lease 
they would make all improvements, upkeep and repairs, 
only ''except as hereinafter stated,'' the exception being 
the roof as specified in paragraph 8. The plaintiffs even 
for the last 10 ~-ears of the lease, the period ·of their 
actual tenancy, had no obligations, ordinary or extra-
ordinary, with respect to the roof. The defendants as-
sumed and undertook the entire responsibility for the 
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roof both for the last 10 years and also for the earlier 
15 months period when the plaintiffs had no rights or 
obligations under the lease or with reference to the 
premises. Under the lease the plaintiffs never had any 
obligation with reference to the roof and they accepted 
the premises only upon and subject to the aforesaid 
express liability of defendants for the roof. This further 
is made clear by the provisions of paragraph 3 wherein 
it is stipulated that for the last 10 years the rental of 
$600.00 per month has been agreed upon if the plaintiffs 
will .make certain pennanent improvements including 
the installation of a first.-class front which improve-
ments shall cost not less than $10,000.00. These improve-
Inents were to be commenced on or before June 7, 1946, 
(the beginning of plaintiffs' occupancy), and after they 
were completed the lease expressly forbade the plain-
tiffs from making any further structural changes on the 
premises without the consent of the defendants. Not only 
did the lease require the defendants to keep the roof in 
good condition for the entire term but it forbade the 
plaintiffs from making structural changes of any kind 
after the initial permanent improvements had been com-
pleted. 
The plaintiffs in October of 1945, (R. 37), after the 
lease was signed but before they were entitled to posses-
sion conferred with defendant James L. White about the 
condition of the roof and Mr. White assured the plain-
tiff, Hubert Wolfe, that the roof had been put in good 
condition and that it was in excellent shape. The plain-
tiffs in preparatio~ for their occupancy and to fulfill 
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the tenus of the lease to n1ake pennanent in1provements 
in the ~tore front employed .JLr. A. B. Paulson, a cOin-
petent and qualified arehitect, (R. 3) who in turn ap-
plied to :Jir. Tipton, Superintendent of the Bureau of 
:Mechanical Inspection of Salt Lake City, for a pennit 
to rmnodel the front of the leased property. l\lr. rripton, 
Exhibit "B,' · ( R. 17), refused to grant the penni t be-
cause the roof of the building was unsafe . .J[r. Tipton 
stated that he had notified :Jlr. James L. \Vhite of this 
condition as early as January 22, 1946. Under date of 
April 29, 19-!6, ~Ir. Tipton also wrote to plaip.tiff, Hubert 
\Volfe, informing him that continued occupancy of the 
building would not be permitted until the unsafe con-
ditions with reference to the roof were remedied. Ex-
hibit "C.'' (R. 18) 
The plaintiffs conferred with the defendants who 
refused to do anything with reference to the roof. There-
fore, instead of the plaintiffs being able to take posses-
sion and occupy the premises on June 7, 1946, they were 
denied occupancy until the _roof was fixed, and they were 
forced, because of the refusal of the defendants to do 
so, to correct the defective conditions in the roof to 
meet the requiren1ents of the public officials and the 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. Even after plaintiffs had 
commenced work on ·the roof the work was further de-
layed at the request of the defendant, James L. White, 
who asked the plaintiffs to suspend work so that he could 
have his own inspection made, and plaintiffs again told 
defendant White that it was satisfactory with them for 
him to make the roof safe in any manner that was ac-
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ceptable to the city and at as little expense as it was pos-
sible for him to incur. (R. 33) This last delay at the 
request of the defendant White delayed the work until 
July 31, 1946, so that by reason of all of the circum-
stances instead of the plaintiffs being able to occupy the 
premis-es on June 7, 1946, actually they were not able 
to go into occupancy of their leased premises until No-
vember 9, 1946. (R. 19) 
The plain~iffs in order to occupy their leas·ed prop-
erty at all were compelled to fix the roof themselves and 
bring this action against the defendants for defendants' 
refusal to comply with the terms of the lease. 
The complaint was supplen1ented by a bill of particu-
lars and amended by adding an additional paragraph, 
. ' 
paragraph VIII. \Ye shall now set forth the complaint, 
the amendments as a part of it, followed by the exhibits 
and bill of particulars, omitting all formal parts: (We 
have already set forth in full the lease which is Exhibit 
"A" of the complaint and shall not repeat that document 
here). 
(R. 1) Plaintiffs complain of defendants and allege: 
I. 
That all of the parties hereto are now and at 
all times herein mentioned were residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and that the prop-
erty involved herein and hereinafter described is 
situated in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
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II. 
That on or about February 19, l~).f;}, at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, the defendant Sarah White as 
owner of the pre1nises and the defendant James L. 
''l1ite, her husband, as lessors, leased by written 
lease. to the plaintiffs, Hubert Wolfe, Shirley 
'y olfe. his wife, Elliott Wolfe, Kayla Wolfe and 
~Ien·ill Strong, copartners; doing business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, under the firm name and style 
of 'Yolfe's Department Store and.to Wolfe's De-
partnlent Store, a co-partnership, as lessees, copy 
of which lease is hereby referred to, attached 
hereto as Exhibit ''A'' and hereby made a part 
hereof, for a term commencing on March 7, 1945 
and ending on ~lay 31, 1956, the following de-
scribed premises located in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to-wit: 
The one-story building, basement and 
balcony, commonly designated as 248-256 
South State Street, having dimensions of ap-
proximately 78 feet 3 inches on State Street, 
by 123 feet 6 inches in depth. 
III. 
That said lease provided by paragraph three 
thereof that on or before June 7, 1946, lessees, 
plaintiffs herein, should commence at their own 
expense certain permanent improvements to the 
leased premises, including the installation of a 
first class front, which improvements were to cost 
not less than $10,000.00 exclusive of trade fixtures 
or any other removable fixtures; and said lease 
provided further by the terms of paragraph six 
that the lessees, plaintiffs herein, aceepted the 
premises in the condition and state of repair they 
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were in on the date of said lease to wit: on or 
about February 19, 1945, and that: 
''For the last 10 years of this lease, all 
improvements, upkeep and repairs, of every 
kind and nature whatsoever, regardless of 
the extent thereof and whether the same be 
ordinary or extraordinary, and regardless of 
how the same may be necessitated, except 
as :P.ereinafter stated, including repair and 
upkeep of the heating plant and replacement 
of all glass, including plate glass broken, are 
to be made at the expense of the Lessees.'' 
and that said lease further provided by paragraph 
eight that 
"For the entire term of this lease the 
Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the 
roof of the leased premises in good condition 
and repair; to pay general taxes and lighting 
assessments levied against said property, all 
fire insurance premiums and premiums on 
any other insurance the owner elects to 
carry.'' 
and said lease provided further by the terms of 
paragraph seventeen 
''If Lessors commence and successfully 
prosecute any action against the Lessees to 
protect or enforce any of Lessors' rights here-
under, or if Lessors defend successfully in 
any action or proceeding by the Lessees 
against the Lessors, the Lessees will pay to 
Lessors a reasbnable attorney's fee in each 
such action, and Lessees shall likewise re-
ceive a reasonable attorney's fees if they are 
successful in each such action.'' 
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IY. 
That preparatory to and for the purpose of 
Inaking the pennanent improvem,ents required by 
the tern1s of said lease .as aforesaid, plaintiffs enl-
ployed a con1petent and qualified architect, one 
~\. B. Paulson of Salt Lake City, Utah, and the 
said ... \. B. Paulson on behalf of the plaintiffs ap-
plied to the proper officials of Salt Lake City 
Corporation. to wit: the Superintendent of the 
Bureau of :Jiechanical Inspection, for a permit to 
make said improvements and to remodel the front 
of said leased property and that under date of 
~larch 21, 1946, said A. B. Paulson received a 
letter from the said Superintendent of the Bureau 
of ~Iechanical Inspection, 1Salt Lake 'City Cor-
poration, advising that the said application for 
pennit was being held in abeyance because of the 
unsafe condition of the roof of said leased prem-
ises, copy of which letter is hereby referred to, 
attached hereto, marked Exhibit '' B'' and by 
this reference made a part hereof, and that under 
date of April 29, 1946, the plaintiff Hubert Wolfe 
received a further letter from said Superintendent 
of Bureau of Mechanical Inspection, Salt Lake 
City Corporation, refusing to allow the said 
leased premises to be occupied ·at all until the 
roof thereof was made safe, copy of which said 
letter is hereby referred to, attached hereto, 
marked Exhibit '' C '' and by this reference made 
a part hereof. 
v. 
That h~~ bill No. 51, 1940, the Board of City 
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, adopted 
the "Building Code" of 1940 and that said code 
and ordinance was in full force and effect in Salt 
Lake City at all times herein mentioned; that by 
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the terms and provisions of Section 201 of said 
Code it was provided that no person shall add to, 
enlarge, alter, repair or change any building or 
structure or cause the same to he done without 
first obtaining a building permit therefor from 
the Building Inspector of Salt Lake City, Utah; 
that by the terms and provisions of Section 301 to 
and including Section 305 of said Building Code 
the Office of Building Inspector was created and 
the Building Inspector authorized and directed 
to enforce the provisions of the Code, with all the 
powers, of a police officer and with power and 
authority to enter any building or premises for 
purpose of inspection and to prevent violation 
of the Code, and that said sections also provide 
that any building or portion thereof found to be 
dangerous or unsafe or which violate the pro-
visions of the said Code due to deterioration or 
other defects may be condemned by the Building 
Inspector, and that the Building Inspector shall 
serve notice on the owner in writing or to the 
person in charge of any building or premises set-
ting forth wh::~,t must be done to make such build-
ing safe, and that the person receiving such notice 
shall commence within forty-eight hours there-
after to make the necessary changes, repairs, or 
alterations and proceed diligently with such work 
and that no building shall he occupied or used 
for any purpose after the Building Inspector 
serves written notice of its unsafe or dangerous 
condition until the instructions of the Building 
Inspector have been complied with; that said 
Building Code contained the terms and provisions 
respecting roof construction and roof loads of 
buildings in said city and that all of said ordin-
ances contain other and further relevant pro-
visions applicable to the leased premises herein, 
and all' of said ordinances are hereby referred to 
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and by this reference n1ade a part hereof the smne 
as if they were pleaded haec verba herein; and 
that by Bill No. 11 the City Cmnn1issioners of Salt 
Lake City, Utah adopted an Ordinance effective 
February 21, 19-!G, creating the Office of Superin-
tendent of the Bureau of :\[echanical Inspection 
and pro,iding that such 'Superintendent shall have 
charge of the Bureau of :Jiechanical Inspection 
and exercise all the powers required of and con-
ferred on the Building Inspector by the Uniform 
Building Code 1940 Edition of the Ordinances. 
of Salt Lake Cit~~. which said Ordiances Bill No. 
11 is hereby referred to and by reference made a 
part hereof in all its terms and provisions the 
same as if it were set forth haec verba herein. 
YI. 
That it appears from said Exhibit "B" that 
the defendant James L. White was notified of the 
unsafe condition of the said roof by the Superin-
tendent of the Bureau of l\iechanical Inspection, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, January 22, 1946; and 
plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Hubert Wolfe on 
several occasions prior to June 7, 1946, and 
particularly in ~larch and April of said year, noti~ 
fied and called to the attention of the defendant 
James L. White, the unsafe condition ot said roof 
and the requirements and letters of the said public 
official of Salt Lake City Corporation, to wit: 
the Superintendent of said Bureau of Mechanical 
InspeGtion, and at the same times notified and 
called to the attention of the said James L. White 
to the fact that the plaintiffs were excluded fron1 
possessing said premises for the aforesaid 
reasons, and requested the lessors, defendants 
herein, to put the roof of said leased premises in a 
safe and proper condition and also so as to meet 
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the requirements of the said official of Salt Lake 
City Co'rporation, and so as to provide proper 
drainage facilities for said roof, 1and at the same 
time notified and advised the defendants that if 
proper action on their part was not taken to 
remedy the said conditions plaintiffs would them-
.selves cause the roof to be made safe and in good 
condition and repair and seek to hold the defend-
ants liable for the costs of the same and for their 
attorneys' fees thereupon incurred; that the de-
fendants and each of them failed, neglected and 
refused to take any action towards complying 
with the requir·ements of the said Superintendent 
of the Bureau of M,echanical Inspection, the Build-
ing Code or Ordinances of Salt Lake City Cor-
poration or towards placing said roof in good 
condition . or repair or to make said roof safe or 
to provide drainage for said roof. 
VII. 
That because of the failur·e, neglect and re-
fusal of the defendants or either of them to com-
ply with the said requirements of said Superin-
tendent of the Bureau of M·echanical Inspection, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, the Building Code 
or Ordinances- of Salt Lake City Corporation or 
to ~eep said roof of· the leased premises in good 
condition and repair, and in order to occupy the 
leased pr.emises at all and to make them tenant-
able, plaintiffs were compelled to and did comply 
with said requirements &foresaid and did place the 
said roof in good condition and repair and re-
paired the same to make it safe and in good con-
dition and also so as to provide proper drainage; 
that in complying With said requirements afore-
said in putting said roof of the leased premises in 
good condition and repair and in making the 
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leased pre1nises tenantable, when they were not 
otherwise tenantable, the plaintiffs were cmn-
pelled to and did expend in excess of $12,000.00, 
which was a reasonable sum therefor, and in ad-
dition were dmnaged and sustained financial loss 
hy reason of the defendants' aforesaid. refusal, 
failure and neglect in exeess of the sun1 of $8,000; 
to wit: in the total sun1 of $20,121.58, all of which 
said expenditures are set forth in detail by Ex-
hibit '' D,'' hereby referred to, attached hereto 
and by this referenee made a part hereof, and in 
addition bv reason of defendants' aforesaid re-
fusal, fail~ue and neglect plaintiffs were com-
pelled to and did en1ploy attorneys to prosecute 
this action and have become obligated to pay 
said attorneys reasonable attorneys' fees, which 
plaintiffs on information ~nd belief·allege will be 
in excess of $1,000.00, and that by reason of all 
of the aforesaid plaintiffs have been damaged by 
the acts and conduct of the defendants as afore-
said in the sum of $21,121.58 and that the defend-
ants are indebted to the plaintiffs in said amounts 
for their aforesaid violations of the terms of said 
lease and by their acts and conduct as aforesaid, 
and that no part of said sum has be·en paid to the 
plaintiffs or any of them. 
(First Amendment) (R. 36) 
VIII. 
That defendant, James L. White, drew the 
lease and expressly advised plaintiffs before they 
sign·ed the same that by accepting the premises in 
the condition and state of repair they were then in 
they did not accept the roof which was pro.vided 
for in paragraph 8 of the lease and was defend-
ants' responsibility; that the plaintiffs accepted 
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the said leased premises in the condition and state 
of repair they were in on the date of the lease, to-
wit: on or about F·ebruary 19, 1945, only because 
the defendants agreed that for the entire term of 
the lease they would keep the roof in good con-
dition and repair; that it was the agreement and 
understanding of the parties to the lease that 
for the entire term of the lease the defendants 
were to be solely responsible for the roof of the 
leased premises and would keep the same in goorl 
condition at all times regardless of its condition 
at the date of the lease, and that the plaintiff~ 
had no responsibility whatsoever for the roof or 
for its safety, upkeep, maintenance, repair, or 
condition regardless of the condition that the 
same was in at the time the lease was entered 
into, and it was the intention of the parties that 
the lease express such understanding, and the 
lease was drawn and prepared by defendant. 
James L. White, and executed by the parties in 
the belief that it does so state; that the plaintiffs 
in accepting the premises in the condition and 
state of repair they were then in expressly ex-
cluded the roof, and the defendants expressly 
agreed that the roof was their responsibility and 
not the responsibility of plaintiffs; that the plain-
tiffs did not inspect the roof prior to or at the 
time of the execution of said lease and knew noth-
ing about the condition of the roof, all of which 
was known to the defendants, and the lease wa~ 
entered into with the knowledge on the part of j 
both parties that the plaintiffs knew nothing con- I 
cerning the condition of the roof; that in accepting 
the premises the plaintiffs did not accept an un- : 
safe, defective, or ·unstable roof or a roof that 
" was not in good condition and repair; that after 
the execution of said lease and on or about Oc- · .I 
tober, 1945, and before the plaintiffs attempted 
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to take physical possession of said prmnises the 
defendant, James L. "\Yhite, assured the plaintiff, 
Hubert "\Volfe, that he had put the roof in good 
condition and that it was then in excellent shape; 
that the said roof was not then in excellent shape; 
that after the said lease was entered into the roof 
conunenced to sag, and plaintiff, Hubert Wolfe, 
called the san1e to the attention of the defendant, 
J mnes L. \Vhite, which sagging gradually become 
worse, but the defendants failed, refused, and 
neglected to do anything to correct this condition 
or to place the roof in good condition and repair 
or to correct the unsafe condition thereof; that 
the defendants at all times failed, neglected, and 
refused to keep the roof of said leased premises in 
good condition and repair; that in January, 1946, 
the plaintiffs first learned that the roof was ac-
tually dangerous and unsafe, and that the plain-
tiffs then and there called the· same to the atten-
tion of the defendants who refused to put the roof 
in good condition and repair; that the said roof 
was unsafe and was not in good condition and 
repair at that time in January, 1946, and became 
progressively worse so that when the plaintiffs 
were to take physical possession of the property 
June 7, 1946, the said roof had become so unsafe 
as to be dangerous to the life and limb of the 
plaintiffs, their patrons, customers, and any per-
sons entering upon said leased premises; that the 
sagging of the roof became progressively 
worse and the roof was dangerous and unsafe 
because of the matters and things heretofore set 
forth in the complaint and exhibits herein and be-
cause the trussed rafters which form the roof 
framing were greatly undersized for the load they 
were carrying, the water from snow and rain 
would not drain off of the roof and would back up 
and drain into the store and basement and add to 
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the weight of the roof, the weight of the roof it-
self was too great for its supports, and on or about· 
June 7, 1946, by reason of said conditions the roof 
had become dangerous and unsafe as aforesaid; 
that the defendants failed, neglected, and refused 
to keep the roof of the leased premises in good 
condition and repair, and the same was not in 
good condition and repair so that on or about 
June 7, 1946, by reason thereof there was great, 
grave, and imminent danger on said date of the 
roof collapsing and injuring persons in, upon, 
and about the leased premises, and that such con-
dition rendered the premises untenantable so that 
the plaintiffs could not occupy the same in safety 
or at all, and that on said date it was impossible 
to correct the unsafe and dangerous condition of 
the roof without the work, labor, and expenditures 
thereafter done and expended for that purpose 
as heretofore alleged by the plaintiffs in their 
complaint herein; that plaintiffs do not know 
when the said roof first became dangerous and 
unsafe but said unsafe condition became progres-
sively worse from the date of said lease and at 
the time, to-wit: June 7, 1946, when plaintiffs 
were to take physical possession had become so 
bad as to render the said premises untenantable, 
as aforesaid; that the plaintiffs frequently re-
quested the defendants to put the roof in good 
condition and repair, but that the defendants and 
each of them failed, refused, and neglected to put 
the roof in good condition and repair, and the 
plaintiffs were compelled to put the roof in good 
condition and repair at their own expense as here-
inbefore in their complaint alleged; that because 
and as a direct and proximate result of the de-
fendants' failure, refusal, and neglect, as afDre-
said, the plaintiffs sustained the damages and ex-
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penses hereinbefore alleged and as set forth in 
the~r con1plaint, .B~xhibits, and Bill of Particulars 
in the sun1 of $21,121.58, and were c01npelled to 
and did employ attornp~·s as heretofore alleged. 
('Sec-ond an1endment) (R. 51) 
That the defendant J mnes L. White is now 
and at all ti1nes herein n1entioned was a member of 
the Utah State Bar and a practicing lawyer in 
Salt Lake City, Utah; that he drew the lease be-
tween the plaintiffs and defendants and in all 
n1atters and things pertaining thereto he repre-
sented and acted for both defendants, and that in 
the discussion pertaining to the lease and the ad-
visability of having another attorney look over the 
lease prior to the signing of the same by the 
plaintiffs, the plaintiff Hubert Wolfe asked the 
defendant James L. White if there was anything 
in the lease that should be clarified by another 
attorney, and the defendant James L. 'Vhite ad-
vised the said plaintiff that there was no such 
necessity and that the lease w·as in the usual for1n 
with the exception that the plaintiffs were re-
sponsible for everything in connection with the 
building except the roof which the defendant 
James L. White told the plaintiff was the re-
sponsibility of the defendants under the terms of 
the lease; that the said plaintiff then and there 
specifically called the attention of the said de-
fendant to the provision of Paragraph 6 to the 
' effect that "The lessees agree' to and do hereby 
accept said premises in the condition and state 
of repair they are now in,'' and asked the said 
defendant if said provision should not be modified 
to read, "with the exception of the roof," so as 
to express the aforesaid understanding of the 
parties, and the said defendant then and there 
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be neeessary as it would only be· a repetition of 
what was provided for in Paragraph 8, which said 
Paragraph 8 the defendant advised the plaintiff 
expressed such aforesaid understanding and pro-
vided that the sole responsibility for the roof for 
the entire term of the lease was the defendants' 
responsibility and was not under the terms of the 
lease the responsibility of the pla~ntiffs; that the 
said defendant James L. White specifically rep-
resented to the said plaintiff that the language of 
the lease with reference to the acceptance of the 
premises in the condition and state of repair they 
wer·e then in did not include the roof and that the 
plaintiffs had no responsibility whatsoever for 
anything pertaining· to the roof; that the said 
plaintiff then advised the said defendant that 
the plaintiffs would sign the lease if the roof was 
the sole responsibility of the defendants and if the 
language that the plaintiffs accepted the premises 
in the condition they were then in did not include 
the roof; that the said repres·entations of the said 
defendant, as aforesaid, were made as an induce-
ment to the plaintiffs to sign the lease; that the 
said defendant James L. White then and there 
advised the said plaintiff that he, the said James 
L. White, had drawn the lease to incorporate 
therein the aforesaid understanaing of the parties, 
and that the lease did express the aforesaid under-
standing in all respects, and that the language of 
the lease as to accepting the premises in the con-
dition and state of repair they were then in did not 
cover, refer to or include the roof; that the said 
James L. White knew and now knows that the 
plaintiffs signed the said lease because of said 
representations and in reliance thereon, and that 
the plaintiffs did sign said lease because of said 
representations and in r·eliance thereon, and that 
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the said defendants are now estopped to assert 
any other or different interpretation of the said 
lease. and that. the said lease and the language 
thereof to the effect that the plaintiffs accepted 
the pre1nises in the condition and state of repair 
they were then in should be interpreted to exclude 
the roof and all parts thereof frmn such accept-
ance on the part of the plaintiffs. 
\YHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judg1nent 
against the defendants, jointly and severally, in 
the sum of $21,121.58 and for such further reasop.-
able attorneys' fees as plaintiffs may incur herein 
and for their costs here incurred. 
Exhibit "B" (R. 17) 
(Copy of Letter sent to A. B. Paulson 
from ~Ir. \V1n. Y. Tipton.) 
:Jir. A. B. Paulson 
Continental Bank 
City 
Dear Sir: 
~larch 21, 1946 
Concerning your application, dated 1Iarch 
20, 1946 for a permit to remodel the front of the 
property at 250 South State Street: 
It has come to my attention that the rafters 
which form the roof framing have been over-
stressed and are sagging under the load they 
carry, also the girders between columns at the 
rear of the store are undersized and bowed. 
Mr. Jam·es L. White, the owner, was notified 
of this condition January 22, 1946. 
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Obviously if the store is to be under continued 
occupancy this condition must be remedied and 
therefore your application is being held in abey-
ance until assurance is given that the roof condi-
tion will be taken care of. 
A plan showing your proposal will. be ex-
pected. 
Sincerely, 
Signed: Wm. Y. Tipton 
Supt. BJ\f.I. 
Exhibit "C" (R. 18) 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Bureau of 
Mechanical Inspection 
400 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
April 29, 1946 
l\fr. H. Wolfe 
224 :South State 
City 
Dear Sir: 
In regard to your future occupancy of the 
property at 250 South State Street; 
l\farch 20, 1946, l\fr. A. B. Paulson, Architect, 
made application· for a permit to remodel the 
front of this property, which application was held 
in abeyance until assurance was given that the 
roof would be structurally altered to make it safe. 
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It was called to the attention of ~I r. Paulson 
and also ~Ir. 'Vhite, the owner, that this condition 
prevailed. 
I a1n now calling it to your attention as les-
see. 
Recently ~Ir. Hargreaves, the City's Chief 
Building Inspector, made an inspection of the 
roof truss system for the main fore-part of the 
store and he found that the trussess were not 
adequate both as to design and as to erection. 
Also that the main ceiling beams both for the 
front and rear part of the store ar·e sagged and 
are evidently too light to carry the roof load. Also 
that the roof drainage system has proved to be 
inadequate. 
These factors make it mandatory upon me to 
refuse to allow continued occupancy of this struc-
ture beyond this summer season for fear of future 
heavy snow loading which might cause total beam 
and truss failure and consequent collapse of the 
roof structure. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ Wm. Y. Tipton 
Exhibit "D" (R. 1~) 
WOLFE'S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ROOF 
ActU;al Damages 
Roof actual cost ------------------------------------------$13,679.56 
Plus Architects Fees 6% ------------------ 820.77 
$14,400.33 
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Less estimate to 
eliminate ·Posts --·-----$2,099.00 
Plus 6% A. F.____________ 125.94 
$2,224.94 
Overtime paid on Bldg. to rush con-
struction because of delay & to get 
2,224.94 
$12,175.39 
moved some time before Christmas 1,293.86 
(See letter Cannon) 
3 Months Rental to J. White---------·····------ 1,800.00 
Delayed occupancy (3 Mths.) on 
account of roof. Could and would have 
been moved by August 1st according -to 
plan. Fixtures & mdse. purchas·ed to co-
incide with this date. 
4 Months rent old store $375.00 per 
month, minimum rental ---------------·----·· 1,500.00 
Could have leased bldg. to Jack & · 
Jill Shop if I could have vacated on 
schedule. $375.00 per month for every 
month vacant. 
Excess percentage rental paid on old 
store lease from August 1st to No-
vember 9th, date we moved to new 
store --------------------------------------·---------······ 3,282.33 
2¥2% from total sales 
$199,211.99 to$ 200,000 
$19.70 19.70 
2% from total $200,000 
to $362,131.50 3,362.63 
$3,282.33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
George Kelson (Investigation of Roof 
structure ---------------------------------------------- 45.00 
Heath & Burbidge (Survey to ·establish 
corner for proof rafters ------------------ 25.00 
~-\.CTlT AL D~-\.:JIAG ES ------------------------------$20,121.58 
Plus ~-\.ttorney fees & Court costs ____ 1,000.00 
TOTAL ----------------------------------------$21,121.58 
BILL OF PARTICULARS (R. 30) 
Plaintiffs supplementing their allegations of 
paragraph YII of their complaint herein and as an 
addition thereto and as a more detailed explana-
tion of Exhibit "D" of their said complaint, file 
this as a bill of particulars for said purpose and 
show: 
1. Plaintiffs prior to undertaking any work 
with reference to the roof of the leased premises 
consulted with the building inspector of Salt Lake 
City, A. B. Paulson, Slack Winburn and George 
Nelson, architects and structural engineers, to 
determine the quickest and cheapest way of eon-
forming to the building inspector's demand to 
make said roof safe; that plaintiffs advised de-
fendant James L. White of all of their findings 
and many times prior to June 7, 1946 asked him to 
make the roof safe and the said defendants always 
refused so to do~ that plaintiffs thereupon en-
gaged the Cannon Construction Compa~y, com-
petent building contractor, to undertake work on 
said roof, and it was the opinion of all of the 
aforesaid that the best, quickest and most economi-
cal method of making the said roof safe was to 
tear down the entire roof and salvage all of the 
lumber and material that it was possible to sal-
vage and re-use all that could be re-used. This 
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.was done and all the lumber and materials cap-
able of being used were uHed at a great saving 
of material; that steel beam construction was 
used because it was easier to obtain steel due to 
the lumber shortage which prevailed at said time 
and because the use of steel was as cheap or 
cheaper than lumber, and the only kind of lumber 
obtainable at that time was so green as to render 
it unsuitable for this type. of construction; that 
60% or more ·of the old material in the roof was 
used in the work of fixing the roof as aforesaid; 
that since steel was us·ed it was unnecessary to 
continue the use of eight center supporting posts 
in the middle of the store room, and they were 
eliminated and the added cost of $2,224.94 has 
been deducted in Exhibit '' D'' from the cost of 
fixing said roof. This extra cost was paid by the 
plaintiffs and is not included in the complaint as 
a charge against the defendants. The elimination 
of the posts had nothing whatever to do with fix-
. ing the roof nor did they change the necessity for 
fixing the roof as it was eventually const~ucted. 
All of plaintiffs' fixtures were ordered and are 
not set up in place as though the posts were still 
present and the empty spaces where the posts 
would have been are still present in the store. The 
first item of actual damage in Exhibit "D" for 
$12,175.39 is made up of the following: 
1. The tearing out and r·emoving of the old roof 
structure, salvaging all lumber possible for 
reuse into the new structure. 
2. Sanding that portion of the floor where dam-
age had occurred due to rai:h and sun which 
had occurred while the roof was off. Heavy 
rains fell during the period the roof was off 
and plaintiffs were unable by the exercise of 
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any precautionary measures to prevent dan1-
age to the floor due to this cause. 
3. Structural steel trusses and their erection. 
(Note elin1ination of $2,224.94 above). 
±. Framing and sheathing of new roof struc-
ture. 
5. New roof covering. 
6. Lathing and plastering of ceiling under this 
portion of the h~ilding. 
7. Electric wiring in this portion of the ceiling. 
8. Installation of new roof drains. These drains 
replaced existing roof drains and located them 
properly so as to eliminate further damage 
to the roof from inadequate drainage and 
consequent further liability to the defendants 
for damage to the roof. 
9. niinor sheet metal work for flashings. 
10. Taxes, insurance, and contractor's fee. 
11. Reinforcing beams on roof in rear of build-
ing. 
2. The item of $1,800.00 claimed in Exhibit 
"D" is becaus·e of plaintiff's inability to occupy 
the store at all for three months. Plaintiffs under 
their lease could have been in the store by August 
1, 1946, but by reason of defendants' failure to 
fix the roof they were not able to move into their 
leased premises until November 9, 1946. The 
$1,800.00 was paid defendants by the plaintiffs 
for the period August 1, 1946 to November 9, 
1946 when they were denied all occupancy of the 
premises due to the defendants' violation of the 
lease and when plaintiffs would have been in oc-
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cupancy had defendants complied with their ob-
ligations under the lease. 
3. The two items of $1,500.00 and $3,282.33 
set forth in Exhibit "D" were rent actually paid 
by the plaintiffs for their old premises and which 
they would not have had to pay had they been able 
to move into their premises on August 1, 1946 
as they could have done except for defendants' 
dereliction as aforesaid. Plaintiffs had the old 
premises rented to a sub-tenant who would have 
taken them and paid the rent, but because of de-
fendants' failure to keep the roof of the leased 
premises in good condition, plaintiffs wer·e com-
pelled to pay four months' rent on the old store 
at $375.00 per month and a percentage of their 
total sales as set forth in Exhibit '' D'' which they 
would not have had to pay had they been able to 
occupy the leased premises according to the terms 
of the lease. 
4. The other items of Exhibit '' D'' are self 
explanatory. 
5. As shown by Exhibits "B" and "C" 
plaintiffs commenced their efforts to comply with 
their provisions of the lease in ample time to have 
had the building permit issued and the construc-
tion of the new front promptly under way and 
all of plaintiffs' construction could have been com-
pleted and in actual occupancy by August 1, 1946 
had defendants complied with their obligations 
under the lease. Plaintiffs' fixtures were all or-
d·ered and delivered long prior to August 1 and 
ready to be installed, and plaintiffs were com-
pelled to store said fixtures and all fall merchan-
dise in storerooms in Salt Lake City for none of 
which damage plaintiffs are attempting to re-
cover from defendants. Because of defendants' 
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failure and refusal as aforesaid plaintiffs were 
unable to get a building pern1it from the city 
until June 21 when they immediately started to 
work, but on or about July 5, 1946 defendant 
Jmnes L. "\Yhite asked plaintiffs to suspend op-
erations so that he could have his own inspection 
n1ade and that plaintiffs thereupon told the de-
fendant James L. "\Vhite that it was satisfactory 
with them to make the roof safe in any manner 
that was acceptable to the city and at as little ex-
pense as it was possible for them to incur; to take 
his plans and subn1it them to the city building in-
spector, and that defendant James L. White again 
refused to do anything, insisting that the re-
sponsibility was not his to undertake any of said 
work. This last delay at the specific instance and 
request of the defendant James L. White delayed 
the work until July 31, 1946 and there was fully 
three months delay in securing occupancy of the 
premises due solely to the failure of the defend-
ants to make the roof of said leased premises safe. 
It is agreed that defendants demurrers and 
motions to strike may be considered if defendants 
so desire as applicable to this bill of particulars 
in order that rulings may be made by this court 
without additional delay. 
ASSIGNl\iENT OF ERRORS 
The trial court erred in sustaining defendants' gen-
eral demurrers to plaintiffs' complaint and amendments 
thereto and in dismissing the action. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court stated orally that the general de-
murrers were sustained because of the provisions of 
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paragraph 6 of the lease that ''the lessees agree to and do 
hereby accept said premises in the condition and state of 
repair they are now in.'' The trial court was apparently 
of the opinion that this provision of the lease stands 
alone and is controlling, in spite of many other pro-
visions that limit and modify it and in spite of the allega-
tions of the complaint showing the true meaning of the 
acc-eptance. 
The lease cannot be construed by refe~ence to the 
foregoing provision alone, and to give it the construction 
given it by the trial court results in ignoring other pro-
visions of the lease equally positive which clearly indi-
cate that the lessees'· acceptance of the prernises in the 
condition and state of repair they were then in was only 
because the lessors agreed to take the sole responsibility 
for the roof. Properly construed we contend that the lease 
reads : ''the lessees agree to and do here by accept said 
premises in the condition and state of repair they are 
now in, except for the roof, which is no obligation of 
the lessees either for the period when they are out of 
possession or for the last 10 years of the leas·e, but for 
the entire term of the lease the roof is the sole obliga-
tion and responsibility of the lessors who shall have 
the sole obligation and responsibility for the entire term 
of keeping the roof of the leased premises in good con- ~ 
dition and repair." When the plaintiffs were to go into 
possession and occupancy on June 7, 1946, the roof was 
not in good condition. The defendants had agreed that 
for the entire term of the lease the roof would be in good 
condition and that they would maintain it in good con-
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dition. They did not Inaintain it in good condition, it was 
not in good condition, and defendants refused to put it 
in good condition. In fart the defendants refused to do 
anything at all 'dth reference to the roof. 
It appears to us that a mere reading of the lease 
and the allegations of the complaint demonstrates that 
the defendants violated the terms of the lease and that 
no citation of legal authorities should be necessary to 
demonstrate that fact. However, as we read the cases 
there is no authority whatever to sustain either the trial 
court in its position or the argument advanced by the 
defendants to the trial court. The defendants filed lengthy 
briefs in which they persistently and repeatedly in-
accurately set forth the lessors' obligations with refer-
ence to the roof. They cited nume.rous cases involving 
only the word "repair" to the effect that keeping prem-
ises in "repair" meant only keeping the premises in the 
state of repair they were in at· the time they were en-
tered upon by the lessee. That, however, is not the situa-
tion or the question present here. More than repairs is 
involved. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs never 
inspected the roof, knew nothing about the condition of 
it, had no concern with the roof because of the defend-
ants' assertions and representations that plaintiffs had 
no . responsibility for the roof and that they, defend-
ants, would take care of it. The lease does not limit de-
fendants duty merely to keeping the roof in repair. They 
are also required for the entire term to keep it in good 
condition. The lease says that the lessees obligations do 
not include the. roof. The defendants expressly agreed 
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that for the entire term of the lease they would keep the 
roof not only in repair but in good condition. This obliga-
tion is unlimited and applies whether the work necessary 
to keep it in good condition requires structural changes 
or not. In fact no structural work except the original im-
provements including the store front could be done with-
out consent of the lessors. The lessors refused to perform 
their obligations. The public authorities refused to per-
mit further occupancy of the premises until certain re- · 
quirements were met. It then became the duty and the 
right of the plaintiffs under both the lease and the law 
to meet those requirements and make the roof safe. 
THE COMPLAINT BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE AMENDMENTS STATED A CAUSE OF 
ACTION 
1. The public authorities declared the roof un-
safe and r·efused to permit qccupancy of the 
premises until it was made safe, and that in 
and of itself was sufficient to justify the 
plaintiffs, upon defendants' refusal to do so, 
in fixing the roof and recovering ther·efor 
from the defendants. 
2. The roof was in fact not in good condition and 
the plaintiffs had the right upon defendants' 
refusal to put it in good condition to do so 
thems·elves and hold the defendants liable. 
We shall discuss these propositions in the order 
named. 
~ 
I 
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DEFINITIONS 
Paragraph S of the lease provides: '·For the entire 
tenn of thi:3 lea:3e the lessors shall have the obligation 
to keep the roof of the leased pren1ises in good condition 
and repair. '' 
"For the entire tenn of this lease" means from 
February 1~l. Hl!5, to ~lay 31, H)56, and includes a 
15 months period during which the plaintiffs had no 
obligations under the lease and had no right to the 
possession of the premises. For this period as well as 
for the last 10 years of the lease the defendants agreed 
''to keep the roof of the leased premises in good condi-_ 
tion and repair. ' ' 
"To keep" ,means to maintain and preserve from 
risk or danger from the beginning to the ~nd, T·annen-
baum vs. Sea 001ast Tr. Company, 198 A. 855, &. Words 
and Phrases, under ''to keep.'' 
"Roof" is defined by Webster's New International 
Dictionary as ''the cover of any building, including the 
roofing and all the materials and construction necessary 
to carry and maintain the same upon the walls or other 
uprights.'' The roof is not merely the exterior covering. 
''Good condition'' implies changing conditions, City 
of New Bern vs. Atlantic, 75 S.E., 807 (N.C.), and also 
means reasonably safe condition; sufficient or satisfac-
-tory for its purposes, Missouri K. & T._R. Company vs. 
Smith, 82 S. W., 788 (Tex.). 
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The building inspector's letters, Exhibits '' B'' and 
"C," (R. 17, 18), state that the rafters which form the 
roof framing have been overstressed and are sagging; 
that the girders are undersized and bowed and that the 
trusses of the roof truss system were not adequate, and 
that the ceiling beams both to the rear and front part 
of the store are sagged and too light to carry the roof 
load, also that the roof drainage system was inadequate. 
''Rafters'' according to Webster are the sloping tim-
bers of the roof, and ''girders'' are the beam supports. 
The ''trusses of the roof truss system'' are the members 
forming the frame work of the roof, bracing the roof 
and the rafters. The ''ceiling beams'' are the horizontal 
members supported at the ends to carry the roof load. 
1. THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES DECLARED THE 
ROOF UNSAFE AND REFUSED TO PERMIT 
OCCUPANCY OF THE. PREMISES UNTIL IT 
WAS MADE SAFE, AND THAT IN AND OF IT-
SELF WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
PLAINTIFFS, UPON DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL 
TO DO SO, IN FIXING THE ROOF AND RECOV-
ERING THEREFOR FROM THE DEFENDANTS. 
The defendants drew this lease, (R. 36, 51), and had 
the duty to express the intention of the parties that the 
roof was the sole responsibility of the defendant.s for the 
entire term of the lease. It is our conviction that the 
lease does expressly so provide. The defendants drew 
the lease and because of that fact and also because they 
are the lessors the rule is well settled that any ambigu-
ities will be construed against them and in favor of the 
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lessees (plaintiffs), Teete.r rs. iliid-West Enterprise Co., 
52 Pac. (2), 810, (Okla.1935). 
In the rase of Parr rs. rVas~atch Chcmioal Co., 105 
Utah 272 on page 277. 143 Pac. (2) 281, this court said, 
.. The language ·keep said premises tenantable' indicates 
that the parties understood the warehouse would be made 
tenantable.'' \Y e accepted the premises only with the 
express understanding that for the entire term of the 
lease all parties understood that the roof "would be 
made'' in good condition by defendants. If it was not 
in good condition at any time during the entire term of 
the lease, defendants ·agreed to put it in good condition. 
\Y e did not, as defendants contend, accept the· roof with 
the limited obligation upon the part of the defendants 
to keep it only in the condition in which it was on Feb-
ruary 19, 1945. If the roof was not in good condition 
at that time, then it was defendants' obligation to make 
the roof in good condition and to maintain it in good · 
condition. As we have already pointed out, ''good con-
dition" implies changing conditions and means reason-
ably safe and sufficient or satisfactory for its purposes. 
Under the lease we were not to have possession for 
15 months, and by the express terms of the lease, the 
defendants agreed that the roof, when we did take pos-
session, would be in good condition. They had agreed 
that during the 15 months period they would keep it, 
that is they would maintain it, in good condition. It was 
not in good condition when we attempted to take pos-
session, defendants refused either to make it in good 
condition or to maintain it in good condition, and they 
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did not at any time maintain it in good condition or make 
it in good condition. 
Under the language of the lease we had not right 
prior to June 7, 1946, to do anything at all.with refer-
ence to the premises. Let us assume that prior to 
June 7, 1946, but subsequent to February 19, 1945, the 
city authorities of Salt Lake City had notified the defend-
ants that the building must be vacated until the roof 
was made safe. There can be no question under such a 
situation that the defendants alone would have the obli-
gation to ·comply with the requirements of the city 
authorities. We were not required to do anything with 
reference to improvements before June 7, 1946, and then 
our obligation with reference to improvemen~s, upkeep 
and repairs excludes the roof and is only for the last 
10 years of the lease. 
Having neither the right nor the obligation to do 
anything with reference to the premises prior to June 
7, 1946, it is clear that for that period we were under 
no duty whatever to do anything with reference to the 
roof or any other part of the premises, and had the 
city authorities required the roof to be made safe during 
that period it would have been absolutely no concern of 
ours whatsoever. The roof actually was unsafe during 
that period, so that when our right to possession came 
on June 7, 1946, the roof was not in good condition. The 
mere fact that the city authorities had not taken action 
did not change the fact that the defendants had not kept 
the roof in good condition. That we accepted the prem-
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1ses in that condition would be entirely i1n1naterial. 
If the roof were unsafe, as it was, and we accepted the 
preinises, that did not alter defendants' obligation to 
make it safe and especially is this true by reason of the 
fact that we had no obligation or right of possession 
whatsoever for the- first 15 months. We accepted the 
premises in the condition they were then in only upon 
defendants' express agreement that the roof would be 
made and kept safe for the entire term of the lease, and 
particularly at the time we were to have the right of 
occupancy. The arrival of our time for occup_ancy of 
the premises did not lessen the defendants' responsibility 
for the roof. If anything, it increased it. Defendants 
liad agreed that we might go into possession on June 7, 
1946, but because of defendants' refusal to make the 
roof safe we were not able to occupy the leased premises 
for the purposes for which we had leased them. 
After occupancy even the work that we were re-
quired to do, which expressly excluded the roof, (Par. 
6 & 8) was limited to improvements, upkeep and repairs. 
1N e were expressly forbidden by the provisions of para-
graph 3 to make any structural changes without the 
permission of the defendants. Neither before the time 
of our occupancy nor after that period arrived did we 
have any concern or obligation whatsoever with refer-
ence to the roof. This, it seems to us, appears clearly 
from the express language of the lease. Even if it were 
not clear ambiguities must be resolved in our favor and 
against the defendants. 
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Under paragraph 7 of the lease we agreed to occupy 
the premises in a lawful manner. When we attempted 
to occupy the premises we were confronted with the 
letter from the Superintendent of the Bureau of Mech-
anical· Inspection of Salt Lake City, (Exhibit "C ", R. 
18), wherein he said spea~ing of the unsafe condition 
of the roof, "These factors make it mandatory upon 
me to refuse to allow continued occupancy of the struc-
ture beyond this summer season for the fear of future 
heavy snow loading which might cause total beam and 
truss failure and consequent collapse of the roof struc-
ture." He had already advised our architect that he had 
withheld issuance of the building permit for the remodel-
ing of the front of the property because of the unsafe 
condition of the. roof. (Exhibit "B", R. 17) .~rhus on 
June 7, 1946, when defendants had agreed we might enter 
into possession of the property we were refused a build-
ing permit and thus prevented from making the per-
manent improvements which we had agreed to make 
because· of defendants dereliction, and we were also· 
advised definitely that continued occupancy of the struc-
hue would not be allowed. We could not get a building 
permit, and we could not occupy the premises because 
the roof was unsafe. We could not lawfully occupy 
tpe premises unless and until the roof was made safe. ( 
\Ve were under no duty or obligation to defy the public 
authorities. In fact we were under the contractual obli~ 
gation not to do so. It would have been unlawful for us 
to attempt to occupy the premises. The public authori-
ties had said that the roof was not safe and that we 
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could not occupy the preinises. "\Yhether it was safe or 
unsafe it was not our right to dispute the public auth-
orities. They said the roof was unsafe and that ended 
the n1atter. The burden then was the defendants and 
not ours to satisfy the public authorities either by con-
'incing then1 that they were wrong or by complying 
''ith their requirements. The defendants refused to do 
either. Clearly under the lease itself it was the defend-
ants obligation if the roof ever became unsafe to make 
it safe regardless of when it became unsafe. "Good 
condition'' implies changing conditions and also means 
reasonably safe condition; sufficient or satisfactory for 
its purposes. EYerything the buildi:q.g inspector com-
plained of was in the roof and an essential part of it. 
Aceording to the public authorities the roof was not in · 
good condition. The defendants never at any time at-
tempted by any proper proceedings to remove the ohjec-
. tions of the building inspector or to comply with his 
requirements. The public authorities required the roof 
to be made safe, and the defendants cannot in this pro-
J 
ceeding question that action of those authorities. The 
presumption in this case is that the public authorities 
lawfully performed their duties and whether the defend-
ants received oral or written notice is immaterial in the 
face of the allegations of the complaint that the public 
authorities notified the defendant, James L. White, as 
early as January of 1946 of the unsafe condition, and 
that we did the same thing ourselves frequently there-
after. 'Ve have pleaded the Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City which show that the building inspector was within 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
his right under those ordin~nces in refusing a permit to 
us and in requiring the roof to be made safe. The courts 
will not substitute their judgment for that of the muni-
cipal authorities in exercising their powers. ''The court 
can do no more than to inquire whether an ordinance 
or law is unreasonable, oppressive or discriminatory, 
* * *",Kenyon Hotel vs. 0. S. L. R. CompaJny, 62 Utah 
364, 375, 220 Pac. 382. The court will not substitute 
its judgment for that of the public authorities even if it 
- were so inclined. 8a~t Lake City vs. W estetrn Foundry 
Co., 55 Utah 447, 187 Pac. 829. It was not our duty 
to question the public authorities, and certainly we do 
not believe this court will substitute its judgment for 
that of the building inspector that the roof ·was unsafe. 
Even if the lease had been silent as to the defend-
ants' responsibility with reference to the roof,_ under 
general law they still would have had the obligation to 
comply with the requirements of the building inspector 
to make the roof safe. Unless the lease itself requires 
the tenant to do so the tenant is under no duty to make 
changes, structural o~ otherwise, or alterations or im-
provements ordered by the pu-blic authorities. That is 
the duty of the landlord. Even though the lease required 
the tenant to make repairs, New York held in the case 
of Hera.ld Sqwa~e RBalty Cornpany vs. Saks, 109 N.E. 
545, (N.Y. 1915), that structural and permanent changes 
required by the public authorities were the obligation 
of the landlord. In that case the tenant had approved 
the building plans, agreed to make repairs and to keep 
the premises in good order and condition and to comply 
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with the laws and ordinances of New York. Later New 
York required certain show windows to be moved. The-
New York court held that this was an obligation of the 
landlord in spite of the tenant's agreement and approval 
of the plans as aforesaid. In the case of DeMoines Steel 
Company rs. Ha.u:keye Amusement Company, 174 N.W. 
703 (Ia. 1919), the tenant constructed fire escapes which 
were required by the city ordinances. Even though these 
fire escapes were on the landlord's property not covered 
by the lease the court held it was the landlord's duty to 
compl~- with the law and with the ordinance covering 
the use of the property. (See also N·elson vs. Eicho ff~ 
158 Pac. 370, where the Oklahoma court held that where 
premises become unsafe because of structural change~ 
the landlord must fix them or there is an eviction. In that 
case the tenant agreed to make repairs.) 
In the court below defendants cited numerous cases 
which they contended are contrary to the foregoing rule, 
but each and every one of the cases ~as clearly dis-
tinguishable upon its facts from the case at bar. 
This court in the case of Heywood vs. Ogden Mo·tor 
Company, 71 Utah 417, 266 Pac. 1040 (1928), answers 
many of the arguments made by the defendants below 
in the case at bar. In that case the lessor agreed to 
make certain repairs on the premises and agreed that 
the defendant might go into possession on December 1, 
1924. The defendants were not able to go into posses-
sion on that date and as against the plaintiffs demand 
for rent for September, October and November, 1925, 
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nearly a year after defendants had gone into possession, 
the -defendants claimed by way of setoff· that they were 
kept from possession by the plaintiffs and asked for 
damages on account of being deprived of the leased 
premises for part of the month of December although 
they had already paid the rEmt for -that month. They 
also asked for damages for discontinuance of an elevator 
by order of the public authorities. The trial court held 
that because defendants accepted the keys to the pla~e 
they were placed in possession. This court, however, 
held that even though there was no express covenant 
of quiet enjoyment (there is such a covenant here, (R.14) 
such a covenant was implied and because the plaintiffs 
had not done the work they were required to do, and by 
reason thereof, defendants were excluded from posses-
sion, there was a breach of the implied covenant of quiet 
enjoyment and that even though the defendants had 
paid the rent they were permitted to set it off against 
the plaintiffs' demand for rent for other months. This 
court held that the plaintiffs by their failure to do what 
they agreed to do on the premises had excluded the 
defendants from them. This court also said that the 
defendants should have been permitted to offer evidence 
of damage because the public authorities refused to per-
mit the use of the elevator in the building. 
We had the right to make the roof safe and hold the 
defendants for our damages upon their refusal to correct 
the unsafe conditions. "It is well established that upon 
the breach of a landlord of his covenant to repair, the. 
tenant may make the repairs and recover the reasonable 
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expenses therefor fron1 the landlord or charge it against 
the rent.'' (Citing ntunerous cases) 32 Am. J ur p. 590, 
Sec. 715. (See also Teeter vs. Mid-W.est Ent.erprise Cmn-
pany, 32 Pae. (2) 810, supra, holding that wher·e 
the landlord fails to 1nake the repairs and they are sub-
stantial it is optional with the lessee to make the repairs 
at the expense of the landlord). The tenant may recover 
his actual damages to the extent that they are the natural, 
direct and proximate result of a breach of the covenant 
an(! such as may be reasonably supposed to be in con-
templation of the parties at the tim~ of the execution 
of the lease. 32 An1. J ur. p. 592. 
It makes no difference whether or not the landlord 
knew of the ordinance or knew that he was violating it. 
In the court below the defendants contended that they 
received no written notice from the city authorities to 
make the roof safe. That does- not relieve the landlord 
of responsibility. As pointed out by this court in the 
case of W·ilcox vs. Jwmeson, 55 Utah 535, 188 Pac. 638, 
where the landlord has the responsibility he is liable, 
and his ignorance of the ordinance or failure of the city 
to notify him is immaterial. In the case at bar the owner 
had the obligation to make the roof safe both by lease 
and by ordinance, and lack of knowledge or notice is 
no defense for failure to comply with the requirements 
of the ordinance. If the city authorities had permitted 
us to occupy the premises after notifying us of the un-
safe condition of the roof, we would have been civilly 
liable along with the landlord for any injuries sustained 
by persons upon our premises due to the unsafe con- . 
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dition of the roof. In the case of Knight vs. F·oster 
(N. c:) 79 S.E. 614, (a case cited by defendants in the 
court below), the court expressly said that if the land-
lord knew that the premises were in vi~lation of law 
by disrepair both he and the tenant would be liable 
to a third person for any injuries due to the defective 
premises, and particularly if the landlord contracts to 
repair the very thing which is in disrepair. The court 
also said that fixing the gate in that case was a change 
and not a repair and that. the duty was upon the land-
lord to make it but liability was also upon the tenant 
for injuries to third persons, that if the nuisance existed 
at the time of the demise both the tenant and the land-
lord are liable. Under the holding of the Knight case 
we could not safely occupy our leasehold without correct-
ing the dangerous condition even had the city authorities 
been willing for us to do so. 
Defendants argued below that because the roof re-
quire~ structural changes they were under no obligation 
to 1nake them because structural changes are not '' re-
pairs.'' Such a contention is untenable and is directly 
contrary to the express terms of the lease itself, which 
does not confine defendants duty merely to ''repairs.'' 
Defendants so far have carefully refrained from stating 
who was responsible for m8.king the roof safe. We could 
not occupy the premises until it was made safe. Cer-
tainly there is nothing in the lease that places that bur-
den upon us. Had the city required the roof to be made 
safe prior to June 7, 1946, clearly the defendants alone 
would have had the obligation, they having agreed to 
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keep the roof in a good condition for the entire term 
of the lease. The Inere fact that we became entitled to 
possession on June 1, 19-1:6, did not change the defend-
ants· responsibility nor did it impose upon us any duty 
or obligation with reference to the roof. If it was not 
in good condition at that tin1e, it was still the defend-
ants' duty to put it in good condition. This they made 
no effort to do,, and in order to get the benefit of our 
leasehold we were required to perform defendants' duty 
and seek redress in this action. 
Because the city authorities said the roof was un-
safe that fact alone required someone to make the roof 
!3afe. At the time the building inspector declared the 
roof to be unsafe we had neither the actual possession 
nor the right to possession of the premises. We couldn't 
have gone in and fixed the roof had we so desired. It 
was still in this condition when our right to possession 
under the lease accrued. Someone had the duty to fix 
the roof. Nothing in the lease required us to do so, and 
defendants had agreed that they would keep it in good 
condition for the entire term of the lease, so regardless 
of the condition of the roof at the time the lease was 
entered into or regardless of what was required to make 
the roof safe defendants had not kept it in good con-
dition, and it was not in good condition when we had the 
right to take over. So far as we were concerned when 
the city authorities said the roof was unsafe that was 
conclusive. If there had been no roof at all on the prem-
ises and \Ve had accepted the1n in the condition in which 
they were then in, the defendants under the terms of 
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this lease would have been required to have a roof in 
good condition upon the property at the time we took 
possession, June 7, 1946. By accepting the premises 
in the condition they were in we did not cancel the 
defendants' obligation assumed in the later provisions of 
, the lease to see that there was a good roof on the prem-
ises when we became entitled to occupy them some 15 
months later. As said by this court in the Farr vs. 
Was1atch Chem.ical Oo. case, supra, the parties understood 
that the roof would be made in good condition and this 
good condition was to exist for the entire term of the 
lease and particularly at the time when we were to take 
over the occupancy of the premises. ''Good Condition'' 
implies changing conditions and means reasonably safe 
condition; sufficient or satisfactory for its purposes. 
2. THE ROOF WAS IN FACT NOT IN GOOD CON-
DITION AND THE PLAINTIFF1S HAD THE 
RIGHT UPON DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO 
PUT IT IN GOOD CONDITION TO DO SO THE~f­
SELVES AND HOLD THE DEFENDANTS 
LIABLE. 
The complaint originally was drawn upon the theory 
that the decision of the city authorities that the roof 
was unsafe was final and als:o that the roof in fact was 
unsafe. When the court sustained the general demurrer 
to this complaint, we amended by alleging other facts 
which it had not up to that time seemed necessary to 
allege. We then specifically alleged that the defendant, 
James L. White, drew the lease and expressly advised 
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us that in accepting the pren1ises in the condition and 
state of repair they were then in we did not accept the 
roof because under .para?raph 8 of the lease the roof 
was defendants' responsibility. We also alleged that 
plaintiffs accepted the premises only because the defend-
ants agreed that theirs was the sole r.esponsibility for 
the roof and that in accepting the premises the roof wa~ 
excluded from that acceptance. vVe also alleged that 
the plaintiffs did not inspect the roof, knew nothing about 
the condition of it, and that this was known to the defend-
ants, and that the lease was entered into with the knowl-
edge on the part of both parties that the plaintiffs knew 
nothing concerning the condition of the roof; that in 
accepting the premises the plaintiffs did not accept an 
u~safe, defective or unstable roof; .that on or about 
October 1945, the defendant, James L. White, assured 
the plaintiff, Hubert Wolfe, that he had put the roof 
in good condition and that it was in excellent shape.' 
'\Ye alleged that the roof was not in excellent shape, and 
after the lease was entered into the roof commenced to 
sag and that the sagging became worse and this we 
called to the attention of the defendants who refused 
t1 to correct the condition. We also alleged that the roof 
was unsafe and not in good condition and repair in 
January and became progressively worse, and that at 
the time we were to take possession in June it had 
become so unsafe as to be dangerous; that we do not 
know when the roof first became dangerous but that it 
did becon1e dangerous and became progressively worse 
from the date of the lease until on June 7, 1946, the 
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premises were untenantable because of the roof. We also 
alleged that the defendant, James L. "\Vhite, is a n1em- · 
her of the Utah Bar, and that upon being asked if there 
was anything in the lease that should be clarified the 
defendant, James L. "\Vhite, advised the plaintiff, Hubert 
Wolfe, that there was no such necessity, and that it 
was unnecessary in paragraph 6 of the lease to put an 
exception as to the roof after the provision that the 
lessees accepted the premises, because that would only 
be a repetition of that which was provided for by para-
graph 8, and that the said defendant expressly stated 
that paragraph 8 contained such an exception; that the 
defendant, James L. White, told the said plaintiff that 
the language with reference to the acceptance of the 
premises did not include the roof, and that such repre-
sentation was made as an inducement to the plaintiffs 
to sign the lease, and that the plaintiffs signed the lease 
in reliance upon such representations. We then alleged 
that defendants are now estopped to assert any other 
or different interpretations of the said lease. (See para-
graph VIII of the complaint, R. 36, 51) 
We still believe that the lease does exactly what 
:Mr. White represented to the plaintiffs it was intended 
to do. However, the trial court disregarded this inter-
pretation of the lease and apparently in spite of defend-
ants' general demurrers and the legal admissions conse-
quent thereto, still felt that the language of paragraph 
6 was controlling in spite of all the other modifying 
provisions of the lease. The trial court singled out one 
provision of the lease and gave no effect whatever to 
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the other provisions which should be read in connection 
with paragraph 6. 
Be that as it n1ay, the complaint as amended does 
definitely establish that the lease must be interpreted 
as we have indicated it should be. Every one of the 
defects pointed out by the building inspector were in the 
roof itself. The roof was not in good condition. Defend-
ants agreed to keep it in good condition, and they did 
not do so. For our present purposes in view of the 
general demurrer the foregoing facts are established. 
That we are entitled to damages follows as a matter of 
law under all the authorities. The special demurrers 
and motions to strike were ove.rruled, and we can com-
plain only of the sustaining of the general demurrers. 
That it was error to sustain them we believe "is estab-
lished. 
The defendants also asserted below that because 
of the provisions of paragraph 11 they were not liable 
in, any event. That paragraph provides, "Lessors shall 
not be liable for any damage occasioned by failure to 
keep said premises in repair." We are not complaining 
of defendants' failure to keep the premises in repair. 
That paragraph did not exempt defendants from lia-
bility for failure to keep the roof in good condition, and 
it is that failure of which we are here complaining. 
In fact we interpret paragraph 11 to mean that defend-
ants' will not be liable for our failure to keep the prem-
ises in repair. We do not believe it exempts defendants 
from liability they expressly assumed and with reference 
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to a part of the premises for which they had exclusive 
liability. 
Defendants cited many cases construing similar pro-
visions but none of them were applicable to the facts 
here, and none of them relieved a lessor of liability aris-
ing out of property over whi~h he had assumed exclusive 
and entire control. For instance defendants cited a 
number of California cases, but they did not cite a later 
case from the Supreme Court of California, Colttmbia 
Lab<Orabori.es vs. California Beauty Supply Company, 
148 Pac. (2), 15 (1944). In that case the Supreme Court 
of California announced principles that do apply to the 
case at bar. On page 160 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia says: "The rule that there is no implied obliga-
tion upon the landlord, in the absence of statute, to keep 
the demised premises in repair or fit for occupancy, 
applies only to the premises actually leased, and does 
not operate to free the landlord from liability to the 
tenant for injury arising from defects in other portions 
of the premises of which the lessor retains possession and 
control, (citing cases). In other words, the defendants' 
character as landlord does not e~empt them from the 
consequences of their own negligence, although the in-
jured party happens to- be their tenant." That case 
involved a defective roof from fire occurring without 
fault of the landlord which caused the tenants' goods 
to be damaged by rain leakage. There was no express 
obligation on the part of the landlord to keep the roof 
in good condition, but the court held that the landlord 
having control of the roof was liable for failing to keep 
j 
I 
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it in good condition. Our case is stronger than the Cali-
fornia case because here the landlord expressly assumed 
entire responsibility for the roof for the entire term 
of the lease. The si1nple answer to defendants' argu-
ment with reference to paragraph 11 is as indicated, that 
we are not c01nplaining of defendants' failure to keep 
the roof in repair, we are complaining of defendants' 
failure to k~ep the roof in good condition. 
Upon general demurrer the original complaint stated 
a cause of action as it likewise did after the amendments. 
The court erred in sustaining the general demurrers, 
and its judgment of dismissal should be reversed. 
- . 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONE:S, 
RICH & STRONG, 
Atf)(wnerys fior Plailnti.ff s 
and .Appellamts. 
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